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Beruf and Squirrel **James/Weber: Improving Our Minds**

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As a form of intellectual assault on traditional philosophical trends, pragmatism had appeared at the beginning of the 20th century both to show what is it like to solve the real epistemological problems and prevent us from possible blunders we can make in future. Weber and James, the two key thinkers, whose pragmatic moves towards the phenomenon of knowledge were revolutionary, will be of main interest in the present paper. Not all, of course, but just one aspect of pragmatism I wish to examine: how should we really conduct ourselves and share our ideas in order to elaborate a more adequate knowledge about the world?

If to ask an intellectual not trained in cumbrous speculations, who was William James, her answer may be as follows: James was an American professor of philosophy who wanted us to stop thinking of the truth as such but rather look for truths that exist in reality we live in, verify them and make them useful to our everyday life. Such an answer would be correct. Indeed, James was a thinker who tried to launch new methods and work with new tools for solving old metaphysical questions that lasted actually intriguing up to the days when he had finally recognized himself as a philosopher. And since then, using George A. Miller's words, "he was forever expecting to find something more, something new and unexpected, and he tried to leave his theories open towards the future and the abundance it would bring."¹ Such an eminent academic don as G.

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¹ George A. Miller, *Psychology: The Science of Mental Life*, Penguin Books (London: 1962), p. 91.

E. Moore says that Professor James wants us to think metaphysics (or, philosophy and life as a whole) keeping in mind the following propositions: a) we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true; b) all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true; c) all our true ideas are useful; d) all those of our ideas, which are useful, are true.¹ This remark points to James as a metaphysician who looks for the practical foundations of the truth and the true foundations of our practical life: actions and beliefs. In short, James started to think 'pragmatically' (in 1907 he wrote a book entitled *Pragmatism*) in order to demonstrate how and why *all true ideas are useful and all useful ideas are true*.

Unlike James, Max Weber does not consider pragmatism as a method of his philosophy. He elaborates a new science called sociology; this should grow up in the genuine theory of society which would be capable to give a true picture of social stratification and of the man's needs which compose the central problems of any society. From this point of view, Weber invents a real pragmatist sociology whose task was to deal with such problems and possibly solve them. The goal of this essay is to show that pragmatism of both authors, even if one counts the numerous methodological distinctions between them, is based on a more profound epistemological necessity to crush a barrier between metaphysical knowledge and practical sphere, between truth and use.

I shall take the sociology of Weber first. In his paper *Science as a Vocation*² (originally entitled *Wissenschaft als Beruf*) Weber introduces the word *Beruf* (vocation, calling) playing a crucial role in his conception of a scientific man, e.g., one who makes science. It seems that the English translations of this word/concept are not satisfactory enough. However, this is a matter of importance. We will hardly understand a true Weber without getting into the real artist's true ideas of pragmatic structure of science and man in science. So, this concept is not only semantically but epistemologically important in Weber's explanation of pragmatism in *Science as a Vocation*. Let me specify it. The term *Beruf* in the Weberian sense means 'calling to the duty,' 'to use the gift' by which one has been endowed, or rather, *Beruf* is one's duty to use his natural gift, to bring this gift to a society where one is up to be a man of science. Anybody has his/her own *Beruf*, using of which

socializes a human nature and implants a man into the system of a social order. What is important in the Weberian concept is that *Beruf* is not only a potential possibility to constitute a human nature through the mechanism of social interaction but also the extreme necessity to do it, in other words, without *Beruf* a man cannot occupy his place in the social space. Weber insists on the fact that in the capitalistic society a man constitutes himself through the use of his *Beruf* and also *Beruf* constructs a man as a part of social organism. *Beruf* thus is the use of a natural gift and, owing to that, the realization by a man his social predestination. For Weber *Beruf* is the actualization of a human essence, a sort of juncture which has the forms of a conscious activity within the society. Weber says:

Naturally, one always receives the answer: 'Of course, I live only for my "calling" [*Beruf*].' This much I deem necessary to say about the external conditions of the academic man's vocation. But I believe that actually you wish to hear of something else, namely of the *inward* calling for science[Weber's italics].³

As we see Weber intends to consider *Beruf* as the sociological concept of social interaction between people with different *Berufs* (with different 'calls for their duty') but also as the new paradigm of science constructing not only the ideology of science but also the use of science and the place and attitude of man to the phenomenon of science. By and large, science, in Weber's eyes, should become a sort of the social objectivization of *Beruf*, of what man has by nature and what he ought to realize as his duty before society. Quite important to maintain that the Weberian concept is not the concept explaining the sociological status of science, but the notion pointing to the position of man in science. To put more precisely, Weber here speaks of a certain sociological interaction between man and science, on the one hand, through the state of *Beruf* man realizes his potential skills in science, he becomes a scholar with more or less revolutionary ideas and, by doing so, actualizes his natural gift constituting himself as a socially significant being, on the other hand, science itself, using human potentials, grows up and requires from man more and more

intensive execution of his *Beruf*, science just calls man to the total actualization of his gifts and to the increase of his activities. So, the true meaning of Weber's concept lies in the total use of human possibilities, his scientific skills which enlarge the field of *Beruf* and at the same time the horizon of the social. I think it is quite obvious that the Weberian concept of *Beruf*, of vocation is pragmatist by the very spirit of this concept. The structure of science, for Weber, is the totality of use of man and his abilities to make scientific discoveries and produce new ideas which would lead to the new scientific results and already these results will extend the limits of *Beruf ad infinitum*. Weber himself more than hints that such a manner of a sociological connection between man and science is akin to the capitalistic era of production. Man uses science as a tool for the enlargement of his social significance and for the actualization of the human potentials and science, in turn, uses man for the increase of its practical power. In the epoch of capitalism the behavior of man in science is structured as a *Beruf-drive*. A scientific man, any professional scholar does not consider himself out of the field of the realization of his skills, without those ideas which can lead him to some new results and he needs those results on the basis of which he can produce some new ideas. What I call 'a *Beruf-drive*' is the essence of the Weberian pragmatic method which he applies to the consideration of the phenomenon of science in the age of capitalism. Man looks at science not as at an innocent intellectual game but as at the tool to increase his potential opportunities and to receive the best practical results from it not only for the sake of scientific progress but also for his own reason. Results which can make his *Beruf* more global and powerful. In *Science as a Vocation* Weber puts it as follows:

Scientific works certainly can last as 'gratification' because of their artistic quality, or they may remain important as a means of training. Yet they will be surpassed scientifically-let that be repeated-for it is our common fate and, more, our common goal. We cannot work without hoping that others will advance further than we have. In principle, this progress goes on *ad infinitum*. And with this we come to inquire into the meaning of science. For, after all, it is self-evident that something

subordinate to such a law is sensible and meaningful in itself. Why does one engage in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come, to an end?⁴

Thus Weber seems to seek a certain pragmatist sense of science. For him science also is the tool of the social interaction between the different generations of scholars and of course between the scholars with different *Beruf*. If so, science is as well the manner of influence of one scholar on the other through the interchange of ideas and results, through the degrees of the realization of *Beruf* and through the discoveries of the other's potentials. For Weber science becomes one of the pragmatic structures of the general sociology of knowledge where man actualizes his own social significance. This actualization of man as a scientific figure, as a scholar or thinker inevitably elicits what Weber calls 'personality' which grows up from the substance of *Beruf*. To be sure, the Weberian concept of personality (*die Personlichkeit*) is the important element of his pragmatic sociology, it means that stage which a person (*das Subject*) reaches through the use of his *Beruf*, through the practical embodiment of his natural potentials. From Weber's point of view, science for man is just the device to accomplish his personality, any subject uses science for his own need, but science as a vocation, has a specific feature that in this use science itself increases more and more and begins to require more and more human possibilities. In this reciprocal use man and science come to a certain level when they cannot exist one from another. For Weber, this is an important symptom of the capitalistic epoch of scientific development: the pragmatic paradigm of the human relation to science goes off the limits of pure philosophical or historical interest and becomes a kind of ideology. An analogy could be drawn between the pragmatist's relation to science and the capitalistic scholar and his deep 'rootedness' in the growth of science (such an analysis of the phenomenon of science is also common to some modern German thinkers as Habermas, Luhman, Rapp and others). This growth of knowledge and the demystification of science Weber names 'intellectualization' that, for him, characterizes the present state of science. The process of intellectualization also signifies the pragmatic attitude towards the phenomenon of science, it really means that man comes across the

numerous differences and the ramifications of a scientific knowledge. In order to execute his *Beruf* man has to confront a problem of choices. He realizes that science is no longer a sort of myth or mystery, and it is not only him who chooses science but also science that takes him as the exigency for its growth and development. Weber points out:

Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualization which we have been undergoing for thousands of years and which nowadays is usually judged in such an extremely negative way.⁵

And further:

One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization means.⁶

It should also be maintained that, for Weber, personality, in the epoch of capitalism and scientific growth, requires commitment to certain ultimate values and meanings of life, the nature of such a commitment is distinct in the different life-spheres. This is again the problem of choice and the realization of a personal calling. In other words, the structure of probity, of what Weber calls *Redlichkeit* (the term also belongs to the Weberian pragmatic sociology), is dependent on the life-sphere in which this commitment—the commitment of choice—expresses itself, that is, each life-sphere embodies its own criteria of this probity. This suggestion can be grounded by specifying the distinct criteria of probity in the spheres of science and politics.

In his work *Science as a Vocation*, Weber turns to such charismatic artist (in Weber's opinion) as Goethe, the man who totally accomplished his *Beruf*, and *Beruf* of whom had deployed the space for the activity of many others. We may note that Weber's respect for Goethe witnesses that probity in all life-spheres is characterized by exclusive devotion to the work at hand. Let us see how Weber himself states it:

As far as his [man's] art is concerned, even with a personality of Goethe's rank, it has been detrimental to take the liberty of trying to make his 'life' into a work of art. And even if one doubts this, one has to be a Goethe in order to dare permit oneself such liberty. Everybody will admit at least this much: that even with a human like Goethe, who appears once in a thousand years, this liberty did not discuss that today. (...) In the field of science, however, the man who makes himself the impresario of the subject to which he should be devoted, and steps upon the stage and seeks to legitimate himself through the experience of asking: How can I prove that I am something other than a mere 'specialist'... Today such conduct is a crowd phenomenon, and it always makes a petty impression and debases the one who is thus concerned.⁷

This devotion, of which Weber speaks, is taking the form of setting out to work and meet the demands of the day. As Weber puts it, such a devotion to meeting the demands of the day on one's calling leads to a conception of probity, which is the need of the pragmatic attitude to the phenomenon of science, is, in any case, the relation of passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. To put this in other words, this threefold relation consists of a passionate devotion to one's ultimate values, a recognition of the demands of the day in somebody's vocation, and the sense of distance required to mediate between one's ultimate values and such demands. Although Weber specifies these constituents of the idea of a scientific probity in relation to the figure of the scholar, they remain to be formal or pragmatic requirements of the idea of probity and academic vocation. Weber ineffably emphasizes the pragmatic attitude to science in the form of a personal *Beruf* in order to show his main sociological directions: science does not exist (or, at least, it has no value) out of the sphere of the use of it, but this *use* is the exigency of any man who is willing to work in the sphere of science and, by this working, man structures science as the realization of his own potential beings. Moreover, in the sphere of science, passionate devotion to somebody's ultimate values presents itself both in one's conception of science and in the

'evaluative ideas' through which the scientist selects and ranks phenomena in terms of their cultural and social significance. However, the will to science—through *Beruf*—is not enough in itself to constitute, so to say, the pragmatic juncture between man and science: "it is a fact that no amount of enthusiasm, however sincere and profound it may be, can compel a problem to yield scientific results."⁸ On the contrary, there is a necessity for a feeling of responsibility which manifests itself as a concern with the demands of the day, as Weber calls it, which in the sphere of science means a concern with the great social problems of the capitalistic age. According to Weber, the realization of this feeling of professional responsibility as scientific practice requires the true capacity to distance oneself both from the activity of science as a social phenomenon through methodological reflection and from one's values through the construction of ideal-type—what in his sociology Weber calls 'charisma' or 'charismatic figure'—in which one's 'evaluative ideas' are given objective form in relation to the social base of capitalism and Protestantism as well.

Thus we can see the real meaning of the Weberian concept of *Beruf* and his conception of science as a sort of vocation. If one considers this notion as a structural one, in a more pragmatic aspect, or as it appears in the historical context of Weber's analysis of society this key-concept has a twofold nature. Along with the dominance of profession, emerging as the internal and external structure of the scientist's activity, such an intellectual comes to 'the double situation of our time.' On the one hand, the scientist depends on the tradition of producing professional labor of 'the professional priest of tradition.' On the other hand, this scientist also depends on the 'modern' tradition which derives from the monks and from the ('ascetic') Protestant understanding of professional work and that which the intellectual takes for consideration together with the bourgeois class. For Weber, the congregation of these two traditions in the limits of *Beruf*—science as a vocation—presents the twofold structure of this concept owing to which the concept, in Weberian sociology, emerges simultaneously as the *professional* and *creative* activity. This is why Weber strongly rejects the interpretation of scientific action, of the scientist who makes a kind of creative work, as something that is not rooted in its potentiality, in its vocation. Because the real sense of such professions consists

in the synthesis of social phenomena and the structure of natural universe. This synthesis, according to Weber, forever requires new discoveries and a permanent renovation of scientific thought on the whole. In Weber's sociology, such a pragmatic paradigm, considering a human intellectual activity as the territory of interaction between vocation and science and science as a tool to evoke human potentials to the real world, could be compared with William James's pragmatic theory of truth, for instance, as the agreement of ideas or beliefs with reality.

The pragmatic definition of truth and the revolutionary rejection of many other metaphysical and traditional problems of philosophy cannot be understood without examining the pragmatist elaboration of such concepts as: reality, experience and truth. Similar to Weber, for James, as a pragmatist, reality is a collective notion for everything that happens, while truth and knowledge evoke how all those things that occur together, that intersect one another and connect one to another in the world. Things happen or take place together in different ways depending upon different goals and purposes. So, truth is a common name for all actions and all consequences happening as the result of such a 'chaotic movement,' in other words, if to sum those conception of truth that James elaborates in his collection of essays called *Pragmatism*, then truth is the general name for verification process, like justice and democracy are names for those ideas and positions of society which we associate with a good life and normal behavior. Thus the pragmatist turn, I think, did happen on the scene of philosophy and social science when the concept of truth as the ultimate answer to some ultimate enigmatic questions have been rejected, and so the notion of reality as something unique and fixed no longer work as the basic principles of epistemological analysis. If so, one can say, we remain in the world without ammo, naked before nature and having lost any true epistemology and picture of 'external reality.' But this is not true. The Jamesian theory of pragmatism does not leave us in this bad situation. James does not neglect such questions as 'What is truth?' and 'How can I name the everyday gyre of things?,' the wrong way round, James makes these questions crucially important for the general pragmatist revision of philosophy. His methodological answer to this question is that truth or a true proposition should be accepted as such only if it

verifies itself. James often says that just those true ideas or beliefs are to be accepted and, as he puts it, adhered to the real world which work and verify themselves as the consequences of our thinking and re-thinking meeting us on the way of expediency (this is a very important point of intersection between James and Weber. In the sociological conception of the latter the notion of expediency is analyzed at great length. Because for Weber, the goal of man and science is to structure itself and reality as the forms of expediency and a task of science is to find such an expedient way of life). James points out:

'The true,' to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas[*italics original*].⁹

In his paper *What Pragmatism means* James shows the principles of how such a pragmatic method works by starting this piece from the well-known story of the man, the squirrel and the tree-trunk. He tells us how a number of his close friends had fallen into what he names a metaphysical dispute. This story is as follows: James's friends had imagined a tree-trunk with a squirrel clinging to one side of it and a man standing on the other side. — '*Does the man go round the squirrel or not?* — The friend tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving round the tree and he fails to do it because the squirrel also moves this way in order to keep the tree-trunk between itself and the friend. The question, paradoxical enough like Xenon's aporia, of their dispute is whether the man went round the squirrel or not. What really happens here is that the squirrel is seated on the tree and the man went round this tree and so James's friend always fails to pass the squirrel. In solving this puzzle James puts the appropriate question to his friends: what you *really mean* when you tried to 'go round the squirrel?' James writes:

He [the friend] goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Everyone had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared therefore appealed to me to make it a majority [...] I immediately sought and found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive position.¹⁰

James describes this situation as purely pragmatic in his sense when he says that if, on the contrary, being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left side, and finally to appear in front of him again, then it is quite obvious that the man will all the time fail to go round the squirrel and see him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel keeps his belly turned towards the man forever and his back turned away.

Needless to say, James solves this metaphysical puzzle by going into the heart of his pragmatic method. He actually poses the question: how many meanings this world has and on how many propositions it is based? What is a true decision of his story? – if so, do we really solve a huge number of such metaphysical disputes? However, for James, the real problem of it does not consist in an affirmative answer or in a somewhat escape from this trap, but it consists in the more general question: does a metaphysical situation have a real sense. In James's philosophy it has a sense if we can experience such a metaphysical situation in the real world, so a sense of any situation lies in the actual experience of it. If the experience of a metaphysical situation is what gives a meaning to it then a meaning of any situation and reality as such appears in the experience of the pragmatic use of this meaning, and if so, a meaning of any situation consists in the real experience of this situation. Ideas and beliefs, I keep in mind, acquire a true sense

when I put them in the situation of work, that is when I charge them to connect to the real world as the only place where ideas and beliefs may receive a certain verification and become meaningful. This is why James suggests that criteria by which we have to assess a belief which relates to a matter of empirical fact are different from those beliefs and ideas which apply to a belief which is concerned only with relations between ideas and these are different again from the criteria which apply to ideas and beliefs whose function is just to satisfy our mental or emotional demands. James does not put much stress on this distinction but they are important for his pragmatic investigation of ideas and beliefs which, so to say, did not pass the pragmatic control of experience and those that acquired a sense through this empirical test. Thus, according to James, a true sense of any situation could be received only through the verification of ideas and beliefs in the space of the reality of things and events. In brief, the Jamesian true sense is the pragmatic use of belief which is an experience of the real. So James totally destroys priori and transcendental character of truth, stated by the previous tradition, and, doing so, he goes further than even empiricist philosophy also. Truth not only obeys to experience, but also is constituted by experience as the truth of a given situation, as something that receives sense from this situation and could not be understood out of it. Such a constitution of truth through the situation of experience, through a pragmatic testing, is the soul of James's pragmatism and, as we can see, is similar to what Weber suggests in his sociology of knowledge. The novelty of this method James explains as follows:

Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and presented absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards

action and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of finality in truth.¹¹

These words, full of a Weberian passion, betrays James not only as the reformer of the previous philosophical tradition but also the philosopher who aims to create a new type of philosophizing, to create a man with a new horizon of thought. I think James moves beyond the boundaries of so-called professional or academic philosophy, he tries to arrange the new approach to reality itself. Pragmatism here is not just a manner of thought but also a manner of being. What are the types of reality that James considers by virtue of his pragmatic method? To be sure, the system of realities, of which James speaks, is presented in many levels or parts like there is a great number of true beliefs passed through the experience of different situations. In struggling against a prioris and the past metaphysics James defines one type of reality as those reality with which truths concern themselves or it is the reality of verified sensations. James argues that sensations are pressed upon us, we have no idea where they come from, and regarding their nature, origination and verity nobody holds control. According to James, human sensations cannot be either true nor false, they only show the fact of their presence. They themselves, teaches us James, are rally neutral from the logical point of view. What could be true or false is just our names or interpretations which we give to them, our theories and hypotheses which we apply to them in order to understand the enigmatic nature of sensations. James also pictures another type of reality when he speaks of our ideas and beliefs taking place in the span between our sensations and the concepts of mind where these sensations are imprinted. Dealing with this type of reality James meets its double character. On the one hand, we often operate with those relations which have a very mutable and accidental features, for example, the relation of temporal and spatial sensations we get in different periods of our life. On the other hand, we are mingling with those relations that have for us a more essential and habitual characters which are grounded in the pragmatic use of these relations as more or less concrete notions. To take James's example from Pragmatism where he gives such

notions as 'likeness' and 'unlikeness.' According to James, these terms don't have an enigmatic nature and are not therefore the real sensations. Why? Because we know how to use them and what they mean for us in some different situations of our everyday life. Simply, we receive these notions from the experience of pragmatic practice but not from the hands of nature or God. However, for James, both types of relation are matters of perception, they have a factual basis. The latter type of relation is the one which actually forms a more practical picture of reality within our theory of knowledge, this type of relation is construed on the ground of the comparison of different sense data. These relations also constitute our logical and mathematical hypotheses of the real world. But all these hypotheses and theories are not of course transcendental paradigms of reality, all of them, as well as reality itself take place in a certain temporal and historical phase of human development. The pragmatic practice of any notions and concepts, constituting and testing our comprehension of reality, is a historical event having no value beyond the limits of those historical situations where we exist, and it has nothing to do with a sort of pure science or transcendental knowledge like in Kant or Husserl. Andrew Reck correctly notes that:

[...] pragmatism is an epistemological temporalism. Interpreting "meaning" and "truth" in terms of intertemporal relations between successive phases of experience, it teaches that conception, judgment, or belief is always an act of a human being standing at a specific moment in the time-flow, facing the future by means of thought, and himself moving forward into that future even while he thinks.¹²

As we see, like Weber, James places the epistemological technique of pragmatism in the historical context which, being always linked to reality, generates the system of meanings that we in turn receive as the true or false picture of the real world. To maintain that this point makes James's pragmatism close to the Weberian sociology because for both of them sense is constituted through the historical experience of human development and only such an experience can settle the correct relation between meaning we have in our mind and reality we live. We cannot receive sense (true or false), if this sense does not pass the contextual examination of situation in

which it would work as true or false. Moreover, in the Jamesian reality, such categories as true and false have no a priori position, they cannot be 'artificially' obtained from the transcendental system of knowledge, these true and false derive from the experience of a real situation which meets a lot of human interests and ambitions. To put this another way, one can interpret the same situation or fact quite differently. For example, Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR: some would spell as the turn to democracy and others would say that it is the disruption of the great country. Both of the speakers tell us the truth but in order to agree with one of them or with both of them we should realize the concrete situation of these speakers. If the first is a successive politician and he has his own interests in the politics of reforms he tells us no doubt truth which is the truth in his situation, but if another one is an official lost his job by virtue of reforms he of course tells us truth which is the real truth in his situation. This example shows that, for James, what we say about reality is dependent upon the point of view or context into which we are thrown out. James is sure that both the sensational and the rational types of reality are dumb, they speak nothing of themselves. What do they mean is only that we mean when we speak of them. So, according to James, what we receive as the order of things and those relations we meet between them are determined by our personal interests and goals. By proclaiming it, James destroys the traditional a priorism of the previous metaphysics, for him, even if we had some ideas and beliefs which were significant for us and what we have taken for granted before our access to the pragmatic experience of reality, these ideas and beliefs will be changed or selected by a number of situation that we pass during our life.

The Jamesian conception of reality in general is that reality itself and the system of things does not begin to be and cease to exist when a human being looks at it trying to grasp it through the concepts of his mind. According to such pragmatism, reality and also truth are the running universe, interpretation and description of which add something important and significant to their nature, and whose nature constructs human knowledge itself through the historical phases of its development. Nevertheless, there is a difference between Jamesian pragmatism and the rationalism of the Weberian sort. From James's point of view, for rationalism,

reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making process and awaits part of its completion from the human activity from the conflict of interpretation which by all means is directed on the future. On the one side, for James, the world is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its adventures and nobody knows what will this movement bring us as a kind of its truth. Reality and truth always appear in the forms of experience which seems not to have the end in this or that situation. Everything changes. The rationalist approach, detaching idea and belief from the uniqueness of experience, devaluates the necessity of the pragmatic experience of all and all beliefs. On the contrary, from the pragmatist's point of view, is a collective notion signifying those things that both resist to human desire and provokes it and stipulates the work of the human mind. In his collection *Pragmatism* James more than once maintains that the universe is construing and changing in response to human wish to know more and more about it. Reality thus is the general name for the whole phenomena of circumstances and happenings. In short, what the pragmatist expunges from his method is the rationalist tendency to oppose that immutable reality to the set of various realities that human experiences afford us. For the pragmatist there is no such thing as 'a privileging reality' or a substantial reality influencing on the other types of reality which we meet in our lifetime. For James, the pragmatists should reject such a substantiation of one reality at the expense of another. No substantial concepts can be applied to the real world which will form the only valuable attitude to things. The phenomenon of reality has to be interpreted as an accumulation of tools for interacting between the infinite number of situation and beliefs that we test and present through the facts of experience.

If we summarize all this then we have to state that a main principle of James's radical pragmatism and his theory of truth is the rejection that the human sensations and beliefs are separated entities signifying reality as atomic units. In the Jamesian pragmatism ideas and beliefs acquire their meaning and value through the experimental relations to the system of things. Our relations and ideas, says James, appear as the sort of experience and work by dint of the pragmatic practice and only so they are meaningful and valuable for the human consciousness. This is

why... consciousness itself is a kind of function structuring a human vision of reality through the use of concepts which show that the relation between nature and world is eternal.

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